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I. INTRODUCTION 
In their pioneering article on the effects of taxation on risk- 
taking, Domar and Musgrave 1 showed that although the imposition 
of an income tax with full loss-offset might lead to less private risk- 
taking, total risk-taking would in fact increase.2 If there were no 
loss-offset, they noted that the amount of risk-taking could either 
increase or decrease, although the presumption was for the latter. 
Their analysis rested on individual indifferences curves between risk 
and mean. The limitations of this kind of analysis are well known.3 
The purpose of this note is to investigate the effects on the 
demand for risky assets of income, capital gains, and wealth taxa- 
tion, with and without loss-offsets, using a general expected utility 
maximization model, and to examine the welfare implications of 
these alternative taxes. 
* The research described in this paper was carried out under a grant from 
the National Science Foundation. After this paper was completed, a paper 
by J. Mossin, "Taxation and Risk-Taking: An Expected Utility Approach." 
Economica, XXXV (Feb. 1968), containing some of the results of Sections IV 
and VI was published. I am indebted to D. Cass and A. Klevorick for their 
helpful comments. 
1. E. Domar and R. Musgrave, "Proportional Income Taxation and 
Risk-Taking," this Journal, LVI (May 1944), 388-422. 
2. For further discussions, see C. Hall, Jr., Fiscal Policy for Stable 
Growth (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965); R. Musgrave, The 
Theory of Public Finance (New York: McGraw Hill, 1959); and M. Richter, 
"Cardinal Utility, Portfolio Selection, and Taxation," Review of Economic 
Studies, XXVII (June 1960), 152-66. 
3. If the measure of risk is variance, then it requires a quadratic utility 
function, or that the returns from the asset be described by a two-parameter 
probability distribution. The quadratic utility function has some very peculiar 
properties, e.g., marginal utility becomes negative at finite incomes and the 
demand for risky assets decreases with wealth. See J. R. Hicks, "Liquidity," 
Economic Journal, LXXII (Dec. 1962), 787-802, and K. J. Arrow, Some As- 
pects of the Theory of Risk Bearing (Helsinki: Yrj6 Johnssonin Saittib, 1965.) 
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II. THE BASIC MODEL AND SOME BEHAVIORAL HYPOTHESES 
An individual has initial wealth We. There are two assets in 
which he can invest his wealth. The risky asset yields a random re- 
turn per dollar invested of e (9) where 9 has a probability distribu- 
tion F (0). The safe asset yields a sure rate of return per dollar in- 
vested of r. If we adopt the convention that e-(9) is nondecreasing 
with 9, then we can depict the pattern of returns for the two assets 
as in Figure Ia.4 It is assumed that e (0) does not depend on the 
amount invested in the risky asset, and that r is nonnegative. The 
individual wishes to maximize the expected utility of his wealth 
at the end of the period. If he invests (1-a) of his wealth in the 
safe asset and a in the risky asset, then his wealth at the end of the 
period is 
(1) W= W0(1+ae+ (1-a)r).5 
If we denote by E the expectations operator, then he wishes to maxi- 
mize 
(2) E{U(W)}=-{U(Wo(l+ae(9)+(1-a)r))}dF(9). 
If U" <O, in the absence of taxes a necessary and sufficient condi- 
tion for utility maximization is 6 
(3) EU'(e-r)=0. 
In the literature on uncertainty, two measures of risk 
aversion have been extensively used: absolute risk aversion 
-U"(W)/U'(W) =A(W) and relative risk aversion -U"(W) W 
U'(W) = R (W). Pratt7 has shown that an individual is indifferent 
between an uncertain wealth with mean E (W) and arbitrarily small 
variance U2; and a certain wealth of EW-A (E (W) ) -2 (which equals 
4. The "safe" asset may also yield a random return and the analysis is 
unaffected, provided only that the safe asset is unambiguously safer. This 
means that if under some allocation of his wealth, the individual's income is 
greater in state 0 than in state 0', then under any alternative allocation his 
income is not less in state 0 than in state 0'. The pattern of returns can be 
depicted as in Figure Ib. 
5. Throughout, we assume that his only source of wealth in the next 
period is from purchases of assets in this period. 
6. This assumes that the individual can borrow as well as lend at r, and 
sell short as well as buy securities, i.e., a is not constrained. If a is constrained 
between Oa<1, then (3) holds only for interior solutions; otherwise 
a(1-a)EU'(e--r)=0; (1-a)EU'(e-r)<O; and aEU'(e-r)>0. For the re- 
mainder of the analysis we shall assume that an interior maximum exists. 
7. J. W. Pratt, "Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large," Eco- 
nometrica, Vol. 32 (Jan.-April 1964), pp. 122-36. 









Patterns of Return of Safe and Risky Asset 
EW 1-R (E (W) ) j ) ; where a'= o/E (W), the coefficient of vari- 
ation). 
Arrow 8 has argued that: 
A. Absolute risk aversion decreases as wealth increases. 
B. Relative risk aversion increases as wealth increases. 
These assumptions about the utility function are equivalent to 
the following assumptions about how the allocation to the risky asset 
changes as wealth increases: 
A.' As wealth increases, more of the risky asset is purchased, 
i.e., the -risky asset is superior. 
8. K. Arrow, op. cit. 
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B.' As wealth increases, the proportion of one's wealth in the 
risky asset decreases. 
It is easy to show that A and A' and B and B' are equivalent: 
(3) defines an implicit equation for a in terms of W0. Using the 
implicit function theorem and integrating by parts, the result is 
immediate. This result can also be seen graphically as follows. 
We consider the special case where there are only two states of the 
world, 01 with probability Pi and 02 with probability P2. If the in- 
dividual purchases only the safe security, his wealth at the end of 






Constant Absolute Risk Aversion 
W(01) = W(02) = Wo (1+r). If the individual purchases only the risky 
asset, his wealth at the end of the period is represented by the point 
T, with W (01) = Wo (1+e (01) ) and W (02) = Wo (1 +e(02) ), where 
e (0k) > e(02). Then by allocating different proportions between the 
two he can obtain any point along the line TS. We have drawn in 
the same diagram indifference curves for different values of EU, 
where 
(4) EU= piU(W(01) )+p2U(W(02)). 
As WO increases, the budget constraint giving different possible. 
values of W(O1) and W(02) moves outward, but with unchanged 
slope. The individual maximizes expected utility at the point of 
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tangency, i.e., where the marginal rate of substitution equals the 
slope of the budget constraint: 
(5) pU'(W (01) e(02)-r 
P2U'(W(02)) e(0j)-r 
This means that the slope of an Engel curve is given by 
(6) dW(2) -U" (W (01) ) /U' (W (01) ) ]A (W (91)) 
dVdW(01) [-U"((WV(02))/U'(V(02)) ] A (WV(02)) 
The demand for the risky asset can be written as 
(7) aW0o= W (01)-Wo (1 +r) W (02)-Wo (1 +r) 
e(01)-r e(02)-r 
If the risky asset is neither superior nor inferior, then it is 
easy to see that the Engel curves must have a slope of 450; since 
with increments in Wo, he purchases only the safe asset, the incre- 
ments in W(01) and W(02) must be equal: 
dW (1) dW(+r) dW(2) 
dwo dWo 
From equation (5), this means that A(W(1)1) =1 or absolute risk A (W (92)) 
aversion, -U"/U', is constant. If the risky asset is superior, the 
Engel curve must have a slope everywhere less than unity; since 
W(02) <W(01), this means that absolute risk aversion must be de- 
clining. 
If we divide all terms in equation (7) by WO, we immediately 
see that if a is to remain constant, then the ratio of W(01) to WO 
must remain constant and the ratio of W (92) to Wo must remain 
constant, i.e., W(01) must be proportional to W(02). All Engel 
curves must be straight lines through the origin, and have unitary 
elasticity (see Figure IIb), so from equation (6) 
dln W (02) -[U" (VW (1) ) W (1) /U' (W (1)) - 
din W(91) - U"[U (W(02)) WV(02)/U'(W (02))] 
which implies constant relative risk aversion. If a is to decline, as 
WO increases, the Engel curves must bend upward (towards the "all 
safe" ray OS). The elasticity must be greater than unity, which 
implies increasing relative risk aversion. Conversely, if a is to in- 
crease as Wo increases, relative risk aversion must be decreasing. 
The validity of these testable hypotheses can only be deter- 
mined empirically. Certainly, the hypothesis that risky assets are 
not inferior seems reasonable. The second hypothesis is somewhat 




Constant Relative Risk Aversion 
more questionable. Arrow,9 in addition to suggesting several theo- 
retical reasons for its validity, has argued that the empirical evi- 
dence from studies on the demand for money also support it. Stig- 
litz 1 has raised some questions concerning these arguments, and 
the empirical evidence for it seems, at best, rather weak and con- 
tradictory. For instance, certain cross-section estate data leave 
some doubt whether individuals do allocate a larger percentage of 
the portfolio to safe assets as their wealth increases.2 
In the next two sections we will show that if these hypotheses 
9. K. Arrow, op. cit. 
1. J. Stiglitz, "Review of Some Aspects of the Theory of Risk Bearing," 
Econometrica (forthcoming). 
2. R. Lampman, Share of Top Wealth-Holders in National Wealth, 1922- 
56, National Bureau of Economic Research (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1962), provides the following data on average portfolio allocation 
to bonds and cash for different estate sizes (males): 
Age 
Size of Estate 30-40 55-60 75-80 
70- 80,000 12% 20.2% 26.2% 
100-120,000 11.5% 19.1% 23.5% 
200-300,000 11.A% 15.3% 20.7% 
There is some difficulty in interpreting the data, however, since the invest- 
ment opportunities for rich people may be different from those for poor. Data 
of J. Spraos ("An Engel-Type Curve for Cash," Manchester School, XXV 
(May 1957), 183-89), for the United Kingdom, and D. S. Projector and G. S. 
Weiss (Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers (Washington: Fed- 
eral Reserve Board, 1966)), show similar patterns. 
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are correct, then we can make some unambiguous statements about 
the effects of taxation on risk-taking, independent of the probability 
distribution of returns for the risky asset, but if these hypotheses 
are not correct, many of the conclusions of the original Musgrave- 
Domar analysis may no longer be valid. Our measure of risk-taking 
is the individual's demand for risky assets; this is simply measured 
by the fraction of his portfolio devoted to the risky asset. This 
corresponds to the Domar-Musgrave concept of total (or social) 
risk-taking. In contrast, there is no obvious corresponding measure 
of "private risk-taking." One natural measure, which we shall use, 
is the (subjectively perceived) standard deviation of wealth. In 
the absence of taxes, this is simply equal to Woao,, where a is the 
standard deviation of the risky asset. 
III. WEALTH TAX 
We begin the discussion with an investigation of the effects 
of the wealth tax, since this is the simplest case to analyze. A pro- 
portional wealth tax at the rate t means that wealth at the end of 
the period is given by 
(8) W= Wo (1+ (1-a)r+ae) (1-t). 
It should be immediately apparent that changing the tax rate is 
just equivalent to changing Wo in terms of the effect on risk-taking. 
Hence we immediately obtain: 
Proposition 1 (a). A proportional wealth tax increases, leaves un- 
changed, or decreases the demand for risky assets as the individual 
has increasing, constant, or decreasing relative risk aversion. 
After tax private risk-taking, P, is given by 
P= [E(W-E(W))2]2= [E(Woa(l-t)) (e-Ee))2]?,, 
= Woa(1-t)o' 
where cr2 = E (e - Ee) 2. Whether private risk-taking increases or de- 
creases from an increase in the tax rate depends on whether 
dlnP dmna 
d In(1-t) d ln(1-t) 
But implicit differentiation of the first order condition for ex- 
pected utility maximization yields 
da E {-U"W(e-r)/(1-t)} 
dt Et-U"(e -r) 2WO} 
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d ln(1-t) aE{-U"(e-r)2Wo} 
The denominator of the second term on the right-hand side is al- 
ways positive. Hence whether 
-d (1 t) is greater or less than 
unity depends on the sign of 
-EU"(e-r) =E(-U"/U')U'(e-r) =E(A(W(G)) 
- A (W (0*) ) U'(e -r) +A (W (0*) ) EU'(e -r) 
where 0* is defined by e (0*) = r. The last term equals zero (since 
utility maximization requires EU'(e-r) = 0). If absolute risk aver- 
sion increases with W, in those states of nature where 
e (0) > e (0*) = r, A (W (0) ) > A(W (0*) ) , so-}3U"1(e -r) >O0. 
Similarly if absolute risk aversion decreases with W,-EU" (e- r) <0. 
Hence, we have shown: 
Proposition 1 (b). A proportional wealth tax increases, leaves un- 
changed, or decreases private risk-taking as the individual has in- 
creasing, constant, or decreasing absolute risk aversion. 
IV. INCOME TAXATION 
The case of income taxation with full loss-offset is only slightly 
more difficult to analyze. We can write after-tax income, Y, as 
(9) Y=WO(1-t) [(1-a)r+ae], 
and his wealth after tax is 
W=Wo[1+(1-t) (ae+(1-a)r)]. 
We begin the analysis with the case of only two states of nature. In 
Figure IIla we have drawn the before-tax budget constraint ST. 
Income is measured by the distance from, say, T to Wo or S to WO, 
so an income tax at the rate t reduces the returns from investing 
in only the safe asset or the risky asset to S' and T', respectively. 
The after-tax budget constraint is the line joining T' to S'. It 
is clearly parallel to ST. Note, however, that a is not constant along 
a ray through the origin, but along a ray through the point Wo. 
Thus, it is immediately apparent that in this simple example if in- 
dividuals have constant or increasing relative risk aversion, or in- 
creasing absolute risk aversion, risk-taking will increase. But if 





Income Tax: Demand for Risky 
Asset Unchanged 
there is decreasing relative risk aversion, just the opposite may 
occur. 
Before taking up the more general case, we should note the 
special case where r =0, i.e., the safe asset is money and has a zero 
rate of return. Then the after-tax budget constraint coincides with 
the before-tax budget constraint but T'S is shorter than TS and the 
values of W(91) and W(02) are identical to their before-tax values: 
all the tax does is to induce individuals to hold more risky assets. 
(See Figure IIIb.) 
In the more general case, only slightly stronger conditions are 
required to guarantee that a proportional tax will increase risk- 
taking. The condition for utility maximization is simply 
EU'(e-r) =0. 
It is of the same form as the no-tax condition, since both the risky 
and safe asset are taxed proportionately. 
We wish to know, how does a change with t: 
-E (e-r) 
(10) d--1- ( ct -EU" (e-r) 2 ( 1-t) WO 
After-tax private risk-taking is again measured by 
P=Woa(1-t)a 




Income Tax: r=0. 
so whether private risk-taking increases or decreases depends on 
whether 
d in a 
d In(1-t) 
But from (10), we immediately see that 
(10) d In a WorEU"(e-r) 
d 1n(1-t) -aEU"(e-r)2WO 
The denominator of (10) is always positive, so whether in- 
creasing taxes leads to more or less investment in the risky assets 
depends on the numerator of equation (10). If we set r=O, from 
(10)' it is immediately apparent that a increases, and in proportion 
to the change in (1- t). It is also clear that if there is increasing 
absolute risk aversion, as in the quadratic utility function, the 
second term is unambiguously positive and the percentage increase 
in a from a percentage decrease in (1- t) is greater than unity.3 
If in equation (10), we recall that Y=W-Wo, we obtain the 
result that the numerator of (10) is equal to 
E 3 S 7=ER(W(0))-R(W(*)) 
3. See above, pp. 269-70. 
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-Wo(A(W(0))-A(W(0*)))} U(etr)+{R(W(0*)) 
-WoA (W(0*))}E P _ r 
where 0* is defined as above. If there is constant or increasing rela- 
tive risk aversion and constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion, 
the first term above is unambiguously positive, and by equation (9) 
the second term is identically zero. Thus, a is increased. But from 
(10)', if there is decreasing absolute risk aversion, a is increased by 
a smaller percentage than the percentage decrease in 1- t. 
If there is decreasing relative and absolute risk aversion, in- 
vestment in the risky asset may be unchanged or decreased as the 
result of the imposition of an income tax. To see this more clearly, 
consider the following utility function, and assume that the proba- 




Then, for W> Wo, marginal utility is just 
U'=A (W-W0)a>0 
so absolute risk aversion is 
U" d n UP -a 
->0 UW dW WWo> 




while relative risk aversion is 
-U"W -aW 
-U' W-Wo 
and is decreasing, 
dU"W 
U = aWo 
dW (W= Wo)2O 
-U"c -U"Y But since U (W-WO) = , = - a, a constant, it is clear that 
the numerator of equation (10) is zero. Thus, for a perfectly well- 
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behaved utility function, with diminishing marginal utility and de- 
creasing absolute risk aversion, the imposition of the income tax 
leaves the demand for risky assets unaffected. Similarly, we can 
construct examples where it decreases the demand for risky assets. 
We can summarize the results in the following proposition and table: 
Proposition 2. Increased income taxes with full loss-offset lead to 
increased demand for risky assets if 
(a) the return to the safe asset is zero, or 
(b) absolute risk aversion is constant or increasing, or 
(c) absolute risk aversion is decreasing and relative risk aver- 
sion increasing or constant. 
If none of the above three conditions is satisfied, it is possible for in- 
creased taxes to reduce the demand for risky assets. 
If r>O, private risk-taking increases, is unchanged, or de- 
creases as absolute risk aversion is increasing, constant, 




EFFECTS OF INCOME TAX ON RISK-TAKING: d In(1t 
Absolute 
Relative Risk Risk 
Aversion Aversion 
Decreasing Constant * Increasing * 
<1 
Decreasing but may be greater 
or less than zero. 
Constant 0<d ma <1 dl1n(1-t) 
Increasing 0<d I (1 - <1 1 >1 
* It is impossible to have constant or increasing absolute risk with nonincreasing rela- 
tive risk aversion. 
V. SPECIAL TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS 
Our present tax laws however, do not treat all risks alike; 
indeed, one of the main justifications for the special capital gains 
provisions is that they encourage risk-taking. This, however, may 
not always be the case. Take, for instance, the extreme case of a tax 
only on the safe (or the relatively safe) asset, with no tax on the 
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risky asset. It is easy to show that the demand for the risky asset 
increases or decreases as 
(11) -WOE U"Ir(1 -a) (e - r (1-t) ) +EU'r:::O 
and by arguments exactly analogous to those presented above, we 
can show: 
Proposition 3(a). A tax on the safe asset alone will increase the de- 
mand for the risky asset if there is constant or increasing absolute 
risk aversion. 
Rearranging terms in (11), we obtain the result that the sign of 
da/dt depends on the sign of 
rE { Uj W+1 } U'-WorE (U") (1 +e). 
Under limited liability, e > -1, so the second term is unambiguously 
positive, while the first term is positive if 'relative risk aversion is 
always less than or equal to unity. Hence, we have shown 
Proposition 3(b). A tax on the safe asset alone will increase the de- 
mand for risky assets if relative risk aversion is less than or equal 
to unity. 
If there is decreasing absolute risk aversion and relative risk 
aversion is greater than unity it is surely possible for the tax on 
the safe asset to lead to less rather than more risk-taking. In Sec- 
tion VII, we shall compare this tax explicitly with a proportional 
income tax. 
VI. No Loss OFFSET 
We now examine the effects of no loss-offset provision in an 
otherwise proportional income tax. After-tax income is given by 
WO[l+ae+(1-a)r (1-t)] if e<O. 
Y= 
Wo[1+ (ae+ (1-a)r) (1-t) ] if e>O. 
Diagrammatically, the after-tax budget constraint looks as depicted 
in Figure IVa, if r is greater than zero, or as in Figure IVb, if r= 0. 
Observe that the value of W (02) if the individual purchases only 
risky assets is unchanged (i.e., T and T' lie on the same horizontal 
line). We can see that there is an "income effect" and a "substitu- 
tion effect," and in the cases discussed in the previous section, these 
will be of opposite signs, so that the net effect is ambiguous. It is 
easy to see, however: 
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W(e2 
wo E ~~~T 
w w(e1) 
FIGURE IVA 
Budget Constraints: No Loss-Offset 
Proposition 4(a). For sufficiently large tax rates, the demand for 
risky assets is reduced. 
To see this, all we have to observe is that for tax rates near 100 
per cent, almost the entire portfolio is allocated to the safe asset 
since, as the tax rate approaches 100 per cent, the maximum return 
on the risky asset approaches zero and the expected return becomes 
negative. Since the indifference curves are convex, the demand 
curves for the different assets are continuous functions of the tax 
rate. 
Moreover, it is easy to show that there will always be less 
risk-taking than with full loss-offset. Consider first the effects of 
partial offsetting, where we are allowed to deduct a portion of losses 
from the risky asset from other income. Income, when e <0, can be 
written 
[ae(1-v) + (1-a)r(1-t) ]Wo, v<t. 
No loss-offset is the extreme case where v = 0. Without loss of gen- 
erality, we adopt the following convention about 0 0 is defined 
de (0) 
over the interval [0, 1], e(0) =mine; d >0; e (0') =0. 
Now, what happens as v is reduced? This will depend on the 
sign of 
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W(e2) 
wo C K w 
FIGURE IVB 
Budget Constraints: No Loss-Offset 
with r=O. 
f[-U"{e(1-v)-r(1-t) }eaWo-U'e]dF(O) 
which is unambiguously positive. Hence, we have: 
Proposition 4 (b). The demand for the risky asset is always less with 
no loss-offset or partial loss-offset than with full loss-offset. 
We shall now attempt to find some more precise conditions under 
which risk-taking unambiguously increases or decreases. For sim- 
plicity we limit ourselves to the case where r= 0. We can write the 
first order conditions for expected utility maximization as 
(12) fU'e (1-t) dF (G) +SU'edF () =0 
0' ~~~~~0 
so the sign of da/dt is that of 
(13) f[-U"ae2(1-t)Wo-U'e]dF(O) 
-U (W-W ) ]U'edF (0) 
We thus obtain: 
Proposition 4(c). If r= 0 the imposition of an income tax with no 
loss-offset decreases the demand for the risky asset if relative risk 
aversion is less than or equal to unity.4 
4. The Bernoulli utility function, U=lnW, has constant relative risk 
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One more condition will now be derived. If we integrate equa- 
o Y 
tion (13) by parts, letting H () =fU'edF () , and a-W we obtain 
(14) -fH(O) V +- __W da___){dU~Ua w do 
+ {-U (W-W ) 1}H(1). 
If there is increasing relative risk aversion the integral expression is 
negative. Assume that the maximum rate of return is m, so that 
U"/W\W- W -U"W W<Wo(m+1); since m/m for 
the second term to be negative, all that we require is that relative 
risk aversion be less than m+1/m at its maximum. If m is 50 per 
cent, then relative risk aversion need only be less than 3. Thus we 
have: 
Proposition 4(d). If r=O, the imposition of an income tax with no 
loss-offset decreases the demand for the risky asset if there is in- 
creasing relative risk aversion, and if the maximum value of relative 
risk aversion in the relevant region is less than m+l/m, where m 
is the maximum rate of return. 
These results do tend to support the presumption that "social" 
risk-taking will be reduced by income taxes without loss-offset 
provisions. 
Finally we shall show: 
Proposition 4(e). If r=0 an income tax with no loss-offset reduces 
private risk-taking if there is decreasing absolute risk aversion. 
1 8' 
If U2 1 = f e2dF (0) and C22- fe2dF (0) . It is easy to show that private 
0' 0 
risk-taking decreases if 
dBlnra (1-t)221 
< ( _ 
.)2r~ d In (l -t 0 (l0)-21 22 
But from (12) 
aversion of unity. For small values of W, if the utility function is bounded 
from below, relative risk aversion must be less than unity, while if the utility 
function is bounded from above, it must be greater than unity for large 
values of W. See K. Arrow, op. cit. (This is true provided for large and small 
W, R(W) is monotonic.) 
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dIn a of( (-U")e2(1-t)2WO-_U'e(1-t)/a}dF(O) 
d ln( -t) -ef'Ute2 (1-t) 2WodF (9) +o0' ( - U") e2WodF (9) 
< fJ- U"e2 (1- t) 2WodF (9) 
-Of'U"e 2(1- t) 2W0dF (0) - o0'U"e2 WodF(9) 
(1-t) 2Bi 
(1-t) 2or21+0%22 
if U"'>O. But 
dA(W) U"' U"E2 
dW U' UT2 
only if U"'>O. 
VII. WELFARE IMPLICATIONS 
Even if risk-taking is increased by a given type of tax, it is 
not clear that such a tax should be adopted: after all, risk-taking 
is not an end itself. Indeed, there are some who have argued that the 
stock market pools risk sufficiently effectively that there is no dis- 
crepancy between social and private risks, and hence no justification 
for governmental encouragement of risk-taking. It is important 
to observe, however, that some of the taxes considered may be more 
effective in obtaining a given end than others. Alternative taxes can 
be evaluated in terms of (a) losses in expected utility, (b) changes 
in demands for risky assets, and (c) revenues raised in each state 
of nature. Note that the last is much more stringent than compari- 
sons simply between average revenues; two taxes may have the same 
expected revenue, but differ in the revenue they provide in different 
states of nature. 
In this section we shall analyze the welfare implications of the 
preferential treatment of capital gains. To do this, we shall look 
at the polar case where risky assets are completely exempt from 
taxation, and compare its effects with those of alternative taxes. 
A. Comparison of taxes with equal loss of expected utility. 
First, we compare the tax on the safe asset only with a propor- 
tional income tax. From Figures Va and Vb it is clear that the 
demand for risky assets may actually be larger with an income tax 
than with a tax on the safe asset only. ST represents the before-tax 
budget constraint, S'T' the after-tax budget constraint for the in- 
come tax, S"T the after-tax budget constraint for the tax on the 
safe asset only. We have already noted that if the after-tax income 
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from the income tax is given by E', the before-tax income is given 
by B, where E'B lies on a straight line through Wo. Since the tax 
on the safe asset only reduces income in both states of nature by 
the same amount, if the after-tax income from the tax on the safe 
asset only is E, the before-tax income is A, where EA is a 450 line. 
The fact that B may be closer or further from T than A implies 
that the demand for the risky asset may be larger or smaller with 
the income tax than with the tax on the safe asset only. 
Revenue is measured by the vector EA for the tax on the safe 
asset only and E'B for the income tax: one is larger in one state, the 
other in the other state. It can be seen from the diagram that, in 
general, there will not exist income taxes yielding the same revenue 
in each state of nature as yielded by the tax on the safe asset only. 
Similar conclusions hold for a comparison between wealth taxes 
and the tax on the safe asset only. It is possible, however, to show 
that, for the same loss in expected utility, the income tax leads to 
more risk-taking than the wealth tax. See Figure VI. We have al- 
ready noted that B is the before-tax wealth corresponding to the 
after-income-tax situation E', while A corresponds to the after- 
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wealth-tax situation E', where EA lies on a straight line through 
the origin. But since A is closer to S than B, the result is immediate. 
B. Comparison of taxes of equal revenue. 
As noted above, we cannot make direct comparisons of different 
taxes with equal revenue in each state of nature. But we can com- 
pare the taxes indirectly by comparing each with a lump sum tax, 
i.e., a tax independent of the behavior of the individual although 
not of the state of nature. While the effect on risk-taking of a pro- 
portional income tax or a wealth tax is identical to that of the equal 
revenue lump sum tax, a tax on the safe asset only leads to more risk- 
taking but lower expected utility than the equal revenue lump sum 
tax. To see this, observe that in Figure VI the lump sum tax of 
equal revenue to the wealth tax is given by E'A (for the income 
tax it is E'B). The after-lump-sum tax budget constraint is given 
by S'T', so the equilibrium is still at E', and hence the taxes are 
equivalent in their effect on the demand for risky assets and on ex- 
pected utility. In Figure VII, since the revenue from the tax on the 
safe asset only is EA, the after-lump-sum tax budget constraint is 
w(e2) 
S 
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LL, and the equilibrium is given by E', which implies a higher de- 
mand for risky assets but at the cost of a lower level of utility for the 
tax on the safe asset than for the equal revenue lump sum tax. 
The important point to observe is that even if one wished to en- 
courage greater risk-taking, and even if preferential treatment of 
capital gains did this effectively, it is not clear that preferential 
treatment of capital gains is the most desirable way of encouraging 
risk-taking. 
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